This task links to the Course Assessment Specification (CAS): Theories of voting behaviour - sociological model.

The Sociological model is a model based on the psychological attachment that people have to political parties. 

Pulzer (1967), claimed: 'Class is the basis of British party politics; all else is embellishment and detail.'

Traditionally then, political sociologists have identified social class as the most important factor associated with voting behaviour. This is hardly surprising given that one of the major political parties - Labour - was founded upon a commitment to a class, and whose origins lie in the organised trade union movement.

The sociological model of voting behaviour, associated with Butler and Stokes, was based on the consistent finding that social class was the most accurate indicator of likely voting intention. In general, working class voters did vote for the Labour Party, and middle class voters voted Conservative. Usually, about two-thirds of the working class voted Labour, while four-fifths of the middle class voted Conservative.

The sociological (Columbia) school emphasised the group basis of voting. It highlights the fact that although individuals make personal decisions, these decisions cannot be entirely isolated from the other factors, such as social status and friends. Lazarsfeld, Berelson and McPhee (1954) particularly emphasise the role of the family and the political socialisation in influencing voting behaviour. Political socialisation is the transfer of the political culture, values and norms of the new generations in a given society (Almond and Verba 1963). Although it is most intensive in childhood, the political socialization is a process that includes the entire lifetime of the social actors. Attitudes about politics are mainly formed in the childhood According to the proponents of the sociological theory of voting, with the pre-election campaigns the attitudes of the citizens about certain political ideologies, parties and leaders do not change, rather they only strengthen. 

The family is the source of most affiliations such as the social status and families usually show similarities in voting. Glass (1986) is convinced that it is exactly the family through the relation between the parent and the child that has an important influence in the political orientation of voters. The basic values that determine the political life of citizens are learned within the family, as well as the identification with a given political party and the loyalty to this party. However, although family can be relevant in shaping the core values of the citizen, when he or she is still a child, as the social actor grows older, he/she may develop their own political views that are different from those of their parents. Furthermore, this model does not take into consideration that there may be conflict within the social groups. it may be the case that in defiance of family members, one might vote against their social norms.

Friends are an important factor in the political socialisation. Through the conversation that is led in the circle of friends, usually a dominant political opinion is imposed and maintained, which is shared by the members of the group.

According to the sociological theory, the media most commonly strengthen the attitudes which voters have before the beginning of a general election campaign. Hence, it is considered that the influence of media on the voting decision of citizens is minimal.

Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1954) emphasise certain social characteristics of voters such as: class, religion, race and establish a connection between them and the voting for a certain political party. The voting for a certain political party is a type of social activity and the citizens cannot be removed from their social origin when deciding for who they will give their vote.

According to the sociological theory, politics is based on social cleavage. In this manner politics is a matter of group interests. This concept of social cleavages was promoted in the sixties of the twentieth century by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Rokkan (1970).

It was the case in pre-1980s Britain that people tended to vote along class lines. This is known as ‘class alignment’. ABC1s would vote for the Conservative Party and C2DE tended to vote Labour.

There is evidence (post-1980s) of class-dealignment where the electorate no longer vote along rigid class lines. The Independent reported in October 2018 that one of the most remarkable features of the 2017 general election was that Labour could no longer be described as a predominantly working-class party. In the 2017 election there was hardly any class difference between Labour and Conservative voters.

This is significant as it shows while historically class was an important determiner of voting behaviour, this is no longer the case, perhaps because people do not identify so closely with social class as they used to.

Ipsos MORI found that in the 2017 general election, the middle classes swung to Labour, while working classes swung to the Conservatives. Although the Conservatives maintained a six-point lead among ABC1s, Labour increased its vote share among this group by 12 points since 2015.

This is significant as it supports the view that the electorate are no longer motivated by class alignment and traditional expectations that middle classes will vote for more right-wing political parties with the working classes more likely to vote for left-wing political parties. 

A survey published by BMG Research in 2018, found that in 2017, instead of class identity, identities based on values are “highly predictive” of how people vote. The electorate may make a decision to vote for a particular party based on single issues, such as the ban on fox hunting or Tim Farron’s views on same-sex relationships. This is important as it shows that people may not be driven by class but by issues that transcend income levels or employment status.

This would mean that today people are more motivated by their social, economic or religious values than by class alignment.  

When we consider that in 2014, YouGov asked people whether they regarded themselves as “working class”, “middle class” or “upper class”, nine million ABC1 adults said that they considered themselves to be working class, while five million C2DE adults said that they were middle class. This is significant as it shows that people may not really understand the Ipsos MORI classification of people by employment status and therefore it becomes increasingly difficult to comment categorically that class has a tangible role to play in measuring voting behaviour. When political researchers use one classification model to measure voting behaviour and the electorate another driven perhaps by aspiration or income level, it is almost impossible to determine the true impact that class has on voting behaviour.

The term ‘class’ is emotive and riven with ideals that it has taken on a meaning that only really pertains to the individual and therefore is not truly measurable. 

YouGov claims that “the class divide in British politics seems to have closed and it is no longer a very good indicator of voting intention”. It seems that the electorate no longer identifies itself so strongly with class as it did pre-1980s. John Curtice, professor of politics at Strathclyde University, claimed that the reason why people no longer identify so strongly with class is that in order to achieve election success, political parties need to appeal to a broad demographic rather than pitting its hopes on one section of society.

Curtice commented that “It's perfectly obvious why the Labour Party should have wanted to change its class image because the one thing that has undoubtedly has changed about class in Britain is the size of the classes…and the working class, which is traditionally associated with the Labour vote, has become the smaller of the classes”.

This is significant as it shows that political parties need to ensure that their message touches a wide range of voters and is relatively centrist so as to appeal to the majority of the electorate. If people vote along single issue lines before their class, it seems obvious that political parties must adapt their message to suit. Therefore, while historically the Conservative Party would have targeted their low-income tax policies towards the wealthy and Labour would have simply focused on the rights of workers, political pragmatism means that this is no longer the case.

Ipsos MORI reported that in the EU Referendum of 2016, age and class both had an effect on voting behaviour. A majority of 18-34 year olds in every social class voted to remain, while a majority of those aged 55+ in every class voted to leave. But within each age group the middle-classes were more likely to vote to remain, and the working classes more likely to vote to leave, and within each class younger people were more likely to vote remain, and older people more likely to vote to leave. The crossover point was among the middle-aged: middle-class 35-54 year olds voted to stay, working class 35-54 year olds voted to leave.

This is significant as it shows a direct correlation between age and class in relation to the Brexit vote. It would seem that among younger people of all classes, ‘remain’ was the favoured option, whereas for older people of all classes, leave was favoured. That said, it would seem that there was overwhelming support for remain among middle classes while the working classes voted to leave. This shows that there is a direct link between class and voting behaviour within the 2016 Referendum.

There are limitations to this model of voting behaviour. These include:

1. Its inability to explain partisan (party) de-alignment.
2. The over emphasis on the utility of social class as an indicator of voting behaviour.
3. A failure to appreciate the significance of individual policy preferences and assessment of government performance on voting.

Your first task is to watch the video above and write a response to the questions in the comments below:

Does the YouGov electoral data from the 2017 General Election identify the relevance of the sociological model of voting? Give your reasons.

Your second task is to access the Ipsos MORI data on voting behaviour in the 2019 General Election. You can find this data in the pdf attached to the top of this post. What conclusions can you draw about the relevance of the sociological model of voting behaviour in this election? Give statistical examples.